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PROJECT OUTLINE

Cryptonym: NIGHTWATCH

Headquarters Case Officer

Room No. 2403

Extension: 2663

Date: 11 December 1953

Division: WE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

The attached project is presented for approval

Chief, WE/2

Chief/SR

Chief, WE/FI

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Chief, WE

23 Dec. '53

Date

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PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM NIGHTWATCH

1. Area of Operations:

Belgium, port of Antwerp.

2. Purpose:

Project NIGHTWATCH is a part of the REDSKIN program aimed directly at the recruitment and exploitation of "Persons... connected with commercial shipping into Soviet ports" (Field Instruction No. 52-4). Project NIGHTWATCH is the first proposed operation for the REDSKIN program in Belgium.

3. Background:

The exploitation of CAMBISTA/1 personnel in Belgium for Operation ABQUOR having been modified, it was felt that these individuals might be utilized for current REDCAP operations. [] discussed this possibility with [] in Munich on 2 July 1953, and the latter agreed to question NIGHTWATCH/1 (CAMBISTA/2) regarding the potentials of his student group for operations against the Soviets in Belgium. NIGHTWATCH/1 was contacted by [] on 28 August 1953 and plans were formulated for directing selected members of NIGHTWATCH/1's student group toward REDSKIN targets in Antwerp.

It is intended to clear the use of this group with [] on an informal basis. []

4. References:

[] Munich co-ordination: OBBA-685, ROMA-6805.
Headquarters-Munich co-ordination: DIR-27539 (OUT-51813),
MUNI-5943 (IN-36004), DIR-28977 (OUT-54253).
Preliminary discussions with NIGHTWATCH/1: OBBA-799
Operational developments: OBBA-827, OBBA-961.

5. OBJECTIVES: The immediate

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5. Objectives:

The immediate objective of the operation is to use GAMBISTA/1 personnel at the University of Louvain to survey the port area of Antwerp and report the routines and contacts of Soviet merchant marine officers and seamen. This information is to be used to:

- 1) Determine if these Soviet officers and seamen are accessible for eventual development and recruitment attempts, and if so;
- 2) To exploit selected contacts for the purpose of recruiting REDSKIN agents.

6. Targets:

Soviet merchant marine officers and seamen.

7. Tasks:

- (1) The primary task of Project NIGHTWATCH is to supply current information on the Port of Antwerp which has heretofore not been collected by KUBARK or furnished by the liaison service. Both the time and circumstances under which the target personalities are granted shore leave and the places and persons whom they visit will be subjected to close investigation. This phase of the operation will be limited to observation only. No questions will be asked and no contacts made. Until proven otherwise, it will be assumed that every target personality is under constant surveillance by the opposition and that everyone else is an agent provocateur.
- (2) NIGHTWATCH personnel may be used in the recruitment of persons already observed to be in contact with target personalities: stevedores, ship chandlers, sailors of other nationalities, waiters, girls, clerks, etc.. Implementation of this phase of the operation will depend on our relations with NIGHTWATCH personnel regarding direction, security and control of the operation (see para 17 below)
- (3) It is extremely unlikely that NIGHTWATCH personnel will be directed into personal contact with target personalities for recruitment purposes. Should such an opportunity present itself, it will be exploited only after full consideration being given to the problems outlined in paragraph 17 below.

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8. Personnel:

a. Cryptonyms:

NIGHTWATCH personnel are identified by the NIGHTWATCH cryptonyms followed by a number. At present, the cryptonyms in use include NIGHTWATCH/1 through NIGHTWATCH/11.

b. Personal data:

NIGHTWATCH/1: Born, 1 January 1920, Turits, B.S.S.R. He has acted as representative for the CAMBISTA group in their dealings with KUBARK. Extensive information regarding him is available in SR/3. Although he was the original contact for setting up NIGHTWATCH, subsequent planning and direction for the proposed operation has been handled directly with the Principal Agent selected by him.

NIGHTWATCH/2: Principal Agent. Born, 2 January 1928 in Bierasna, U.S.S.R. After schooling in the U.S.S.R., he was a member of the Luftwaffe and Belorussian Units under German Command from 1944-1945, and surrendered to US troops in 1945. He has been active in Belorussian groups in Germany, Great Britain and Belgium since the war and is presently a student at the University of Louvain. He has been observed to be intelligent, aggressive and adaptable to KUBARK handling.

NIGHTWATCH/3 - NIGHTWATCH/11 are all Belorussian students at the University of Louvain.

9. Operational Clearances:

PRQ part II submitted to STC/SPB for operational clearance on NIGHTWATCH/1 and NIGHTWATCH/2. Clearances on other personnel is being requested as personal data becomes available.

10. Cover:

a. Case-officer in contact with principal-agent:

Cover for the case-officer's meeting with the principal-agent will have to be manufactured. The possibility of case officer interest in University affairs or language lessons will be investigated.

b. By the agents performing operational tasks:

The NIGHTWATCH personnel's first sorties to Antwerp will be devoted to an investigation of library facilities, museums, information centers, etc., which are of logical interest to students. Actual visits to these places will provide cover reasons for subsequent trips. To avoid

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the establishment of patterns in their displacements from Louvain, NIGHTWATCH personnel will vary both their means of travel (train, bus, hitch-hiking) and their routes (Louvain-Antwerp direct, Louvain - Brussels - Antwerp, Louvain-Aarschot-Antwerp). In their actual work in the Antwerp dock areas, the agents will adopt pseudonyms and wear inconspicuous dress. They will also benefit from the normal latitude accorded to student leisure activities.

11. Contact and Communications:

a. Between case-officer and principal agent:

Contact between case-officer and principal-agent will ordinarily be made after business-hours in the office of NIGHTWATCH/3. Selection of a safe-apartment in Louvain is also under consideration. In addition, the following open code has been agreed upon for use in an alternate means of communication by mail and an emergency means of communication by telephone.

Soviet merchant marine officer:	Professeur
Soviet seaman:	Universitaire
politruk:	Concierge
Antwerp:	Bruxelles
[]	Appariteur
NIGHTWATCH personnel:	Etudiants
dock or dock area:	Universite
ship:	Voiture

b. Between principal-agent and sub-agents:

Since the principal-agent and the sub-agents are in daily, routine contact, there is no problem of communication here. There is, however, a security problem and the necessity for secrecy and strict compartmentation between agent-teams is recognized by the principal-agent and will be continually stressed by the case-officer.

c. Special problems of communication:

None

d. Alternate and emergency channel:

see a. above.

12. Control and Motivation:

Control of the principal-agent and sub-agents depends wholly upon the willing cooperation of NIGHTWATCH/1 who is both eager to attack the Soviets and anxious to engage the students in his charge in positive activity

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positive activity. It was NIGHTWATCH/1 himself who proposed that his group might undertake "Surveillance of incoming ships and attempt to make contact with the crews" (Attachment ECMA-6805). NIGHTWATCH/1's willing co-operation, in turn, depends in part at least on the amount and kind of professional guidance which he and his group receive from KUBARK. NIGHTWATCH/1 recognised that an operation such as he envisaged would be impossible without KUBARK briefing and support.

It is recognised that the political aims and partisan character of groups such as that to which NIGHTWATCH personnel belong, plus the control which NIGHTWATCH/1 exercises over the student group, present a constant threat to KUBARK control of this operation. It will be made clear to NIGHTWATCH/1 that KUBARK, [] is concerned only with the successful promotion of the REDSKIN program undertaken and that any attempt on his part to enlarge the operation or introduce an extended relationship with him or his group is not within the desire or authority of KUBARK, [] The case-officer will continue to work directly with the principal agent and, therefore, attempt to make him and the sub-agents more dependent on KUBARK.

13. Equipment and Other Support:

- a. None.
- b. None at present. If a successful recruitment results from the operation, all the special equipment necessary for the dispatch of a REDSKIN agent will be required.

14. Co-ordination:

- a. Origination

This Project originated in the Field.

- b. Co-ordination:

This project has been co-ordinated with [] in Munich and the appropriate Headquarters offices of SR.

15. Timetable:

The first sortie into Antwerp by NIGHTWATCH personnel was made on 17 October 1953. Full activation of the first stage of this operation can be undertaken at any time. It is impossible, however, to assign even tentative dates to the three phases of the operation described in paragraph 7 above.

16. Estimated Cost:

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16. Estimated Cost:

For the fiscal year 1 October 1953 to 30 September 1954, costs are estimated as follows:

Travel of sub-agents.....	11,250	Francs
Incidental expenses of sub-agents.....	15,000	
Safe-house (rent and utilities).....	72,000	
Operational supplies.....	10,000	
	108,250	Francs
	or	
	\$ 2,165.00	

17. Special Problems and Commitments:

- (1) The following comments apply SR experience, gained in operational contact with NIGHTWATCH/1 (CAMBISTA/2) and some of his group, to this Project. The NIGHTWATCH operation was initiated through conversations with NIGHTWATCH/1, and consequently must be viewed, during the preliminary stages at least, as involving the CAMBISTA organization. The partisan character of the group and the principles of self-determination which are inherent in such organizations presents the problem of "dual jurisdiction" over the operation, with NIGHTWATCH/1 representing the CAMBISTAS. Past KUBARK experience in dealing directly with NIGHTWATCH/1 has shown that directives issued to him for the performance of group operational tasks often resulted in a muddling of the case-officers' instructions, application of NIGHTWATCH/1's questionable brand of operational initiative to the tasks, unauthorized commitments made to NIGHTWATCH/1's followers and poor reporting. Only unremitting perservance by the case-officer in defining the smallest details concerning the aims, plans, method, requirements, restrictions, etc., of proposed tasks has overcome NIGHTWATCH/1's talents for improvisation and produced satisfactory results.
- (2) Because of the above problems in attempting to direct an operation through NIGHTWATCH/1, it is proposed to continue to deal directly with the principal-agent (see paragraphs 8 b above). NIGHTWATCH/1 has obviously selected his personnel on the basis of personal loyalty to him and dependence upon him. Past attempts to loosen NIGHTWATCH/1's grip on his selected followers have met with failure in other operations unless contact between him and the individuals was severed or reduced, or unless the individuals were actively assisted in establishing their personal independence from NIGHTWATCH/1's influence. However, on the few past occasions when contact was made directly with members of NIGHTWATCH/1's group, it was evident that some of those individuals were far more responsive to KUBARK case-officer's outlooks and directives.

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This seemed to be due to their lack of over-occupation about CAMELISTA/1's prestige and organizational pride which pervaded NIGHTWATCH/1's thinking; a genuine interest and enjoyment (unhampered by organizational decorum) in dealing with Americans; and eagerness to understand and adhere to directives issued by professional intelligence men. It has been learned, however, that direct KUBARK control of these individuals has only been achieved when they have been physically removed from their organizational life and NIGHTWATCH/1's powers of indoctrination. It cannot be predicted that such a separation can be effected for the NIGHTWATCH Project, but it is anticipated that by-passing direct association with NIGHTWATCH/1 will minimize his operational involvement in the operation and allow for firmer KUBARK direction through personal contact with the NIGHTWATCH agents themselves.

3. The probability of RIS penetration of the CAMELISTA group and the laxity of internal security must be continually borne in mind when surmounting requirements and briefings to the NIGHTWATCH personnel. Past experience with the CAMELISTA group has shown that their concept of security does not differ from that of most emigre whose normal activities do not prepare them mentally or emotionally to practice security and compartmentation among themselves. The need for compartmentation between NIGHTWATCH personnel and the rest of the group and between the agent teams within the operation must be continually stressed (see para 11 b above).
4. Although other REDSKIN operations are being pursued [] NIGHTWATCH is the initial Project for the implementation of the REDSKIN program in Belgium and represents the utilization of presently available assets which are best qualified to secure the limited objectives of this operation. The primary value of the NIGHTWATCH operation lies in the acquisition of survey information on the Port of Antwerp which will determine the accessibility of target personalities in this area. Any extension beyond this phase of the operation (see paragraph 7 (2), (3) above) will have to be based on the particular case involved and a review of the above comments.

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